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In Defense of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the 
Case for International Corporate Accountability 
Osama Alkhawaja  
Abstract 
 
In 2014, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) examined evolving international 
standards of corporate accountability and held that legal entities can be found liable for criminal 
conduct as a general principle of international law. Prior to this decision, and in stark contrast 
to trends in domestic legal regimes, no legal entity had ever been prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced 
in an international court. Although this marked a watershed moment in global corporate 
accountability mechanisms, it has had little precedential effect; scholars have argued it is because 
the decision lacked a valid legal basis and is limited in scope. This Comment addresses these 
criticisms by examining the legal and historical record informing the decision and corporate 
accountability in general. Furthermore, it confirms the holding that corporate accountability is a 
general principle of international law and explores the use of this judgment as the basis for 
international corporate accountability.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is not a single individual who sells poison gas to a dictator to be used in 
war crimes, but it is a firm, organized as a legal person that is the provider of 
the gas. It is not a single individual who buys and re-sells stolen diamonds 
and thus lends critical financial support to a dictatorial regime, but an 
enterprise specialized in such lucrative deals.1 
At the dawn of the modern international order, the Nuremberg Court 
famously held that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced.”2 Since then, legal entities3 
have gone unpunished for their criminal conduct under international law, until the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”)—a court originally established to prosecute 
those responsible for the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister 
Rafik Hariri4—became the first international tribunal to convict and sentence a 
legal entity.5 
                                                 
1 Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere Non Potest?: A German Perspective, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. L. 927, 927–
28 (2009). 
2  United States v. Goring, Trial of The Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal, Judgment, 223 (Int’l Military Trib. For Nuremberg, Germany, Oct. 1, 1946). 
3  For the purposes of this Comment, “legal entity,” “corporation,” and “legal person” are all used 
interchangeably to refer to an  
entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation . . . 
consisting of an association of numerous individuals, who subsist as a body 
politic under a special denomination, which is regarded [i]n law as having a 
personality and existence distinct from that of its several members . . . and of 
acting as a unit or single individual in matters relating to the common purpose 
of the association, within the scope of the powers and authorities conferred 
upon such bodies by law. 
  THE LAW DICTIONARY (2d. ed.), http://perma.cc/3422-X7C9. 
4  See The Cases: Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01), THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 
https://perma.cc/3TED-FSBK [hereinafter STL Primary Case]. 
5 Armina Tanja Savanovic, Corporate Criminal Liability in International Criminal Law, 57 (Spring, 2017) 
(unpublished Master Thesis, Lund University), http://perma.cc/PL3D-MJKJ (“Al Akhbar is the 
first case in which corporate criminal liability has been imputed on a corporation which resulted in 
sentencing.”); Yvonne McDermott Rees, Corporate Criminal Responsibility at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, Posting to PhD studies in human rights, HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTORATE BLOGSPOT (May 17, 
2014), http://perma.cc/7ZEZ-6BSF (“[T]his is the first time that an international criminal tribunal 
has found itself to have jurisdiction over corporations.”); Nadia Bernaz, The New TV S.A.L. Case 
at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law, RIGHTS AS USUAL 
(Oct. 31, 2014), http://perma.cc/U6D4-4C5T (“It is the first time an international tribunal 
recognises that corporations may be criminally liable under international law. . . . While limited in 
scope, the Appeals Panel’s decision is the first of its kind and, as noted by other commentators, was 
‘completely unexpected.’ It will hopefully bring an end to statements such as the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s when it asserted in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum that ‘although 
international law has sometimes extended the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
Defending the STL Alkhawaja  
Winter 2020 453 
Central to this decision, the STL held that “corporate criminal liability has 
become a general principle of law.”6 General principles are a legitimate source of 
international law,7 providing the STL with the legal basis to convict a media 
company.8 While the STL acknowledged the novelty of its ruling, the court based 
its decision on evolving international standards, as well as trends in national 
jurisdictions. This marked a significant development in the trend toward 
international corporate accountability, and human rights activists cheered the 
decision as a breakthrough in the fight against corporate human rights abuses.9 
However, in the four years since the STL declared that corporate liability has 
become a general principle of law, later tribunals have failed to uphold or rely on 
this precedent. This reluctance stems in part from a belief that the STL’s decision 
is either limited to contempt crimes or the illegitimate result of judicial activism. 
If the STL misapplied the law, then its decision will not be adopted by the 
international community.10 And if the judgment is limited to contempt cases, then 
it is of little help to prosecutors who seek to punish corporations for committing 
serious human rights abuses and war crimes. 
Responding to these concerns, this Comment defends the proposition that 
corporate liability is now a general principle of law. In doing so, this Comment 
distinguishes between two of the STL’s holdings: 1) the decision to expand their 
jurisdiction over contempt crimes beyond the scope of their core jurisdiction, and 
2) the STL’s substantive analysis of corporate accountability under international 
law. This Comment also examines the process by which rules are formed under 
international law to determine why, prior to the STL, there was no binding legal 
judgment against a corporate entity enforced by either treaties, courts, or 
customary law. This comprehensive review suggests that international law does 
                                                 
individuals, it has never extended the scope of liability to a corporation.’”); Dov Jacobs, The Dream 
Factor Strikes Again: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon recognizes International Criminal Corporate Liability, 
Posting to Spreading the Jam, DOV JACOBS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://perma.cc/45L9-RRQG (“[W]hat 
really deserves attention is this new revolution proposed by the STL: the recognition that legal 
persons can be the target of contempt proceedings. In other words, the STL has now recognized 
corporate liability in international criminal law.”). 
6  Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 6, Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499) 
[hereinafter Scheffer Brief].  
7  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute]. 
8  See Contempt Cases: Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Mr Al Amin (STL-14-06), THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR LEBANON, https://perma.cc/4NHY-SV73 [hereinafter STL Contempt Cases].  
9  See, for example, Savanovic, supra note 5, at 58; Bernaz, supra note 5. 
10 See Lukas Marecek, Criminal Responsibility of Legal Persons Introduced by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
2017 PECS J. INT’L & EUR. L. 62, 69 (2017). 
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not preclude corporate liability,11 and until now the only obstacle has been a matter 
of political will.  
Section II explores the history of corporate liability to explain why 
international corporate accountability did not previously develop under a 
positivist source of law. Section III describes the facts that led to the creation of 
the STL, the specific rules of the court, and the legal arguments employed by the 
various justices. Following the STL’s monumental decision, critics began 
delegitimizing its holding and limiting its scope.12  Section IV responds to these 
criticisms, and defends the STL’s holding that corporate accountability is now a 
general principle of law applicable in the international context. The Conclusion 
argues for the use of this judgment as the basis for the future of international 
corporate accountability. 
II. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY PRIOR TO THE STL 
Assuming the STL’s decision to prosecute a legal entity was rooted in a valid 
analysis of evolving legal trends, the question still stands: why did it take so long 
for an international court to prosecute a legal entity? Perhaps the STL’s decision 
was truly an aberration; after all, “international criminal law has traditionally been 
strongly centered on individual agency.”13 Since as far back as the “the Romanist 
civilist law systems, les personalites juridiques (legal entities) could not be held 
criminally responsible; only individuals could.”14 Lord Thurlow represented this 
ethos in his famous statement that corporations have neither “souls to damn [nor] 
bodies to kick,”15 and they, therefore, do as they like. 
Responding to this concern, this Section explores the history of corporate 
accountability under international law. This historical inquiry will support the 
STL’s holding that corporate criminal liability has now become a general principle 
of law by demonstrating that the previous accountability gap resulted from a lack 
of political will, and not a legal bar. This analysis will cover all the official sources 
of international law, which are “not a static system of rules but rather a decision-
making process.”16 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)—the “principal 
                                                 
11  See Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility before International Institutions, 40 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1029 (2009). 
12 Marecek, supra note 10, at 69.  
13  Carsten Stahn, Liberals vs Romantics: Challenges of an Emerging Corporate International Criminal Law, 50 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 91, 91 (2018).  
14  M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2d rev. ed. 2013). 
15  See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981). 
16  Christoph Schreuer, Sources of International Law: Scope and Application 10–11, THE EMIRATES CENTER 
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH, http://perma.cc/4UCZ-U693. 
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judicial organ” of the U.N.17—utilizes four primary sources of law: international 
conventions, judicial decisions, customary law, and general principles of law.18 
Even if “as a matter of ‘judicial policy’, the Court finds some advantage in giving 
priority to treaty rules over customary norms,”19 there is no formal hierarchy or 
successive order of consideration.20 As a result, these sources of law do not exist 
in isolation but rather interact closely and influence one another. The following 
Section first analyzes general principles, then treaties, followed by customary law, 
and lastly judicial decisions. 
A. General Principles of Law 
A general principle was the source of law invoked by the STL as the basis 
for their decision to prosecute a legal entity.21 The International Court of Justice 
classifies “general principles of law” as one of four legitimate sources of 
international law.22 
General principles are rooted in national systems, and they are those 
principles that are so fundamental to legal orders that they can be found in all or 
most legal systems. Therefore, they are used to fill gaps left by treaties and 
customary law23 and to clarify discrepancies in existing bodies of law.24 Even if 
differences exist in the way national legal systems address an issue, all that is 
necessary to establish a general principle is to show that most countries adopt the 
same notion.25 
One example of a general principle is the “good faith” doctrine, which is the 
notion that parties must act honestly and fairly, observing reasonable commercial 
                                                 
17  History, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://perma.cc/XMK9-W2WS. 
18  ICJ Statute, supra note 7, art. 38.  
19  Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A 
COMMENTARY 677, 774 ¶ 270 (Andreas Zimmermann et al eds., 2006). 
20  Id. at 773 ¶ 265. 
21  In re New TV S.A.L. & Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 67 (Oct. 2, 
2014) [hereinafter Majority Decision] (“[C]orporate liability for serious harms is a feature of most 
of the world's legal systems and therefore qualifies as a general principle of law.”), 
https://perma.cc/J3NG-K2A7. 
22  See ICJ Statute, supra note 7, art. 38. 
23  Schreuer, supra note 16, at 7. 
24  Id.; South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6, ¶ 88 (Jul. 18) (the court invoked “general principles of law” to determine whether a member 
of a community can take legal action in vindication of a public interest when the court’s statute was 
not decisive on the matter). 
25  See Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 27–28 (2013), http://perma.cc/42AX-CUHB. 
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standards, and without intending to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage of 
the other party.26 Because courts in the vast majority of countries take “good faith” 
into consideration in their domestic judicial systems, this indicates that “good 
faith” may be considered a general principle of international law.27 It is not 
required that every state have the same standard for applying “good faith” tests; 
all that is necessary to create a general principle is that most states have a “good 
faith” test. Other examples of general principles are the presumption of 
innocence, the binding nature of contractual agreements, the prohibition of unjust 
enrichment, the principles of procedural fairness before a court of law, and the 
principle of legality.28  
B. In Conventions and Treaties 
Conventions and treaties are “rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states,”29 and thus the most convenient source of law on which judges can base 
their decisions.30 Although there is no current international treaty or convention 
that enforces a binding mechanism of corporate accountability, there is also no 
treaty or convention that forbids it.31 
The absence of any binding accountability measure is largely the result of 
non-legal political determinations; most states are unwilling or unable to prosecute 
legal entities across state borders. This inability stems from “dysfunctional legal 
systems, undercriminalization, and lack of material means, especially in conflict 
zones.”32 This dysfunction even preempts most attempts at local accountability 
                                                 
26  Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 701 (7th ed. 1999) (defining good faith as a “state of mind 
consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (3) 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) 
absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.”). 
27  Loan Agreement between Italy and Costa Rica, REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL 
AWARDS, VOLUME XXV (Jun. 26, 1998) at ¶ 14 (referred to the fundamental character of the 
principle of good faith in international law and included it among the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations). 
28  See Gaja, supra note 25. 
29  ICJ Statute, supra note 7, art. 3. 
30  Pellet, supra note 19, at 775 ¶ 271 (“There can however be no doubt that the application of a treaty 
rule is easier than the search for a customary rule, intuitive though this process might be, and that, 
in turn, it is more practicable for an international judge to investigate international practice in order 
to find a customary rule than to ‘discover’ a general principle of law from an inevitably sensitive 
incursion into municipal laws.”) (citations omitted). 
31  Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 11, at 1032 (“[W]hile the existence of an international enforcement 
mechanism implies the existence of a direct obligation, the opposite is not necessarily true.”). 
32  Alexandra Garcia, Corporate Liability for International Crimes: A Matter of Legal Policy Since Nuremberg, 24 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 114 (2015).  
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measures,33 let alone international ones, and should therefore not be the basis for 
denying international corporate accountability. 
Unwillingness has more to do with countries choosing to protect the 
interests of foreign corporations over the human rights of their own citizens. 
Professor Carsten Stahn,34 a Professor of International Criminal Law and Global 
Justice at Leiden University, argues that there is little incentive for states to 
voluntarily create binding enforcement mechanisms because prosecution of local 
corporations for anti-corruption practices in foreign states will lead to a decline in 
local competitive advantages.35 This unwillingness is sometimes referred to as the 
“enforcement dilemma,” whereby states are “reluctant to engage in investigations 
and prosecutions against foreign agents, due to fears of negative economic 
consequences or dependence on foreign investment, or difficulties to obtain 
evidence.” 36 
This accountability gap, whether caused by unwillingness or inability, 
produces a diametrically opposed outcome: states are unhelpful in efforts to 
enforce international corporate liability through treaties and conventions, even as 
their domestic systems have evolved to include such provisions.37 
C. In Customary Law 
The third source of international law is “international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law.”38 Customary law is often conflated with 
general principles, but there are key distinctions.39 Customary international law 
requires the presence of two elements: 1) “State practice (usus)”40 and 2) “a belief 
that such practice is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of 
the rule, as a matter of law (opinio juris sive necessitatis).”41 Additionally, the “State 
practice has to be virtually uniform, extensive and representative.”42 What this 
                                                 
33  Stahn, supra note 13, at 107. 
34 Garcia, supra note 32, at 114.  
35  Stahn, supra note 13, at 108. 
36  Id. at 107.  
37  Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 351, 351–53 (2016). 
38  ICJ Statute, supra note 7, art. 38. 
39  See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L R. OF THE RED CROSS 175 
(2005) (conducting a comprehensive review of customary international law). 
40  Id. 
41  Id.  
42  Id. at 180. 
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means is that “[d]ifferent States must not have engaged in substantially different 
conduct.”43 
In 2005, the Red Cross produced a report that synthesized and listed what it 
deemed as generally accepted notions of customary international humanitarian 
law.44 The Red Cross did not list corporate criminal liability as a practice of 
customary law. This omission is not surprising given that states differ in the legal 
standards and approaches by which they practice corporate liability, which 
precludes the establishment of a customary law.45 For example, the U.S. has 
adopted the aggregation theory of corporate criminal liability. This theory 
provides that corporations can be held criminally liable based on the act of one 
employee if a group of employees cumulatively, but not individually, meets the 
actus reus and mens rea requirements.46 The English and French models are more 
restrictive because they require that the individuals acting on behalf of the 
corporation hold a high position in the company.47 In contrast, Germany has no 
criminal liability for corporations, and instead employs an administrative-penal 
system to regulate corporate wrongdoing.48 
Until all or a majority of nations agree on the material elements of corporate 
liability, it will not develop into customary law. However, these uniformity 
requirements are not necessary to establish a general principle of law. 
D. In Judicial Decisions 
The final source of international law, as defined by the ICJ, derives from 
international courts.49 Judicial decisions are “not intended to be sources of law in 
the strict sense,”50 but they are instrumental in shedding light on existing laws and 
clarifying legal provisions. Enforcement mechanisms in the form of judicial 
opinions can sometimes lag behind the development of underlying laws, but this 
                                                 
43  Henckaerts, supra note 39, at 180. 
44  Id. at 178–84. While the report does not carry the weight of a judicial decision, it can be understood 
as the equivalent of the American Restatements of the law of torts or contracts. 
45  Id. 
46  See, for example, U.S. v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (adopting this theory, 
known as the doctrine of collective knowledge).   
47  See, for example, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] AC 153 (HL) 170 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (“[T]he person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the 
company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then 
that guilt is the guilt of the company.”). 
48  See Andres Lohner & Nicolai Behr, Corporate Liability in Germany, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS 
(2016), http://perma.cc/BC5J-BYVE. 
49  ICJ Statute, supra note 7, at art. 38. 
50  Schreuer, supra note 16, at 8. 
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does not nullify their existence. Laws can lay dormant for years before enough 
political capital is mustered to enforce them. 
In this case, although no corporation was previously convicted in an 
international court,51 legal entities were nonetheless subject to international law.52 
To support this claim, this Section will carefully examine the legislative history, 
decisions, and political contexts of three of the most influential international 
courts: The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International 
Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice. 
First and foremost is the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(“IMT”). Proponents of the view that corporations are immune from prosecution 
under international law often invoke the legal history of the IMT and its famous 
quote that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.”53 This statement, coupled with 
the fact that no corporations were on the IMT’s docket, is used as evidence that 
international criminal law “is not applicable to collective entities, such as 
corporations.”54 
This reductive view of the IMT misconstrues the court’s intentions by 
stripping away the context in which this statement was made. Even if the IMT did 
not result in a conviction of a legal entity, for the first time in modern history, a 
“judicial body considered the cases of corporations and their agents committing 
war crimes and other violations of international law.”55 
This incremental expansion of judicial scope took place in a time in which 
international law was primarily concerned with state (mis)conduct. Consequently, 
the Nazi defendants standing trial before the IMT invoked the principle that 
“international law is concerned with the action of sovereign States, and provides 
no punishment for individuals.”56 The IMT “explicitly rejected [this] argument by 
affirming that ‘international law imposes duties and liabilities on individuals as well 
as upon States.’”57 Thus, historical evidence suggests that the statement, “crimes 
                                                 
51  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
52  Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 11, at 1032 (“Generally, international law is characterized by a lack 
of international enforcement mechanisms, and both indirect and direct international obligations 
may exist without the possibility of international enforcement.  The existence of such mechanisms 
‘has never been the linchpin of the obligation itself.’”) (citations omitted). 
53  United States v. Goring, supra note 2, at 223. 
54  Jonathan Kolieb, Through the Looking-Glass: Nuremberg’s Confusing Legacy on Corporate Accountability 
Under International Law, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 569, 586 (2017). 
55  Id. at 583. 
56  Id. at 590 (quoting United States v. Goring, supra note 2, at 222). 
57  Id.  
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against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,” was 
“intended as a rejection of this position of impunity put forward by the individual 
defendants. The Tribunal was seeking to extend accountability under international 
law, not restrict it.”58 This decision “marked the beginning of [an] increased focus 
on individual criminal responsibility, which was a departure from the view that 
only the state was responsible when gross human rights violations had been 
committed.”59 
Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude that the IMT’s increased focus on 
individual criminal responsibility precluded corporate liability. In fact, the 
Nuremberg Charter explicitly “authorized the IMT to criminalize legal entities, 
such as the Gestapo”;60 the court, however, did not use this authority because the 
focus remained narrowly on punishing “war criminals.”61 This decision to 
prosecute individual Nazis in the IMT, and not the legal entities they were working 
for, was largely advanced on policy grounds and not because it was perceived as 
legally unsound to prosecute corporations under international law.62 Because every 
corporation operating in Germany had done business with the Nazis, launching a 
campaign against these corporations would likely have crippled the country, 
preventing it from rebuilding and moving on from the war.63 The IMT settled, 
instead, for prosecuting individual commanders and their soldiers. 
Following the IMT, the Allied Powers held a series of subsequent hearings 
to prosecute “war criminals and similar offenders” in the German occupation 
zones.64 During these trials, the link between corporate and regime crimes was 
further investigated, since these companies were not merely doing business with 
the Nazis but were actively facilitating and supporting the war effort. German 
industrial agents such as IG Farben, Krupp, and Flick “faced charges for 
                                                 
58  Kolieb, supra note 54, at 591 (citations omitted). 
59  Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 11, at 1035. 
60  Id. 
61  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, 9 (“At the trial of any individual member 
of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the 
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member 
was a criminal organization.”). 
62  See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Show Trials and Impunity, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.L. 1, 9 (2002) 
(explaining that there was little political appetite to try large swaths of the German citizenry and 
industrialists for war crimes in the aftermath of World War II and thickening Cold War 
atmosphere). 
63  See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The Other Schindlers, 9 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 173, 176 (1995) (“The National Socialist regime placed industry under the control of the 
Reich Chamber of Economics.”). 
64  Douglas O. Linder, The Subsequent Nuremberg Trials: An Overview, FAMOUS TRIALS, 
http://perma.cc/WHA7-7VY5. 
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complicity in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression[.]”65 The 
proceedings fittingly became known as the “Trials of the German Industrials.”66 
Through these trials, the Allied Powers acknowledged that large 
corporations, which actively supported the Nazi regime and played key roles in 
Nazi crimes, could be held liable as purely judicial matter. However, due to the 
same policy concerns expressed at the original IMT, the prosecutors ultimately 
limited their charges to individual corporate officials, directors, and managers, 
rather than pursuing the legal entities themselves. For example, prosecutors 
charged high level officers for the “knowing participation in corporate criminal 
activities,”67 such as contributing to “plunder and slave labor,” “appropriating 
factories in France and the Netherlands,” and “using the labor of prisoners of 
war.”68 
This expansion of liability from states to individual persons, and the 
assertion that corporate entities had in fact violated certain laws of war,69 provided 
a “crucial set of precedents for the development of the modern notion of 
international corporate liability.”70 At the very least, this context demonstrates that 
the famous trials of Nazi individuals were never meant to prevent international 
law from extending corporate liability to legal entities. 
The second judicial instrument to consider is the Rome Statute, the founding 
document of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).71 Now ratified by over 
120 member states,72 the Rome Statute acts as the guiding legal instrument for the 
ICC, giving it the right to investigate and prosecute individuals charged with 
“[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Convention.”73 The ICC is intended to “be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,”74 and it therefore can exercise 
its jurisdiction only when certain conditions are met, such as when national courts 
                                                 
65  Stahn, supra note 13, at 99. 
66  See generally Lippman, supra note 63. 
67  Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 11, at 1036. 
68  Id. 
69  Garcia, supra note 32, at 128. 
70  Id. at 116. 
71  See History, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://perma.cc/K985-MHPK.  
72  Id. 
73  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
(entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
74  Id. at art. 1. 
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are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals. This is referred to as the “principle 
of complementarity.”75 
In a notable omission, the Rome Statute does not give the ICC the 
jurisdiction to prosecute legal entities.76 While this omission initially suggests that 
the drafters intended to preclude international corporate liability, this is rebutted 
by Article 10 of the Rome Statute, which expressly states that “[n]othing in this 
Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”77 
Moreover, the reasons why the Rome Statute did not include corporate 
liability are no longer relevant today. David Scheffer, the first U.S. Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues and the chief U.S. negotiator for the Rome Statute, 
explicitly makes this argument.78 He explains that the reasons for not including 
corporate liability in the Rome Statute were “not because States agreed that 
corporations are above the law as a matter of right or of principle.”79 Rather, it 
was issues of diplomatic expedience.80 He explains that: 
no conclusion should be drawn regarding the exclusion of corporations from 
the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute other than that no political consensus 
could be reached to use the particular treaty-based court governed by the 
Rome Statute to prosecute corporations under international criminal law for 
atrocity crimes. The Rome Statute left other avenues for holding corporations 
accountable for criminal conduct wide open. Any interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, including that found in Kiobel, concluding that the treaty purposely 
meant to express a principle of law precluding national courts of law – either 
civil or criminal – from proceeding against corporations for the commission 
of atrocity crimes or, for that matter, other violations of international law, is 
in error and grossly distorts what transpired during the negotiations leading 
to the Rome Statute.81 
                                                 
75  David Scheffer, The Rome Treaty Has Nothing to Do with Jesner v. Arab Bank, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 
10, 2017), http://perma.cc/D8MZ-AWCU (noting that “a fundamental underpinning of the Rome 
Treaty is the preference for and deference to domestic prosecution”). 
76  Rome Statute, supra note 73, at art. 25.  
77  Id. at art. 10.  
78  See Scheffer Brief, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
79  Id. at 5.  
80  Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons 
from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 156–58 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-
Zarifi eds., 2000) (detailing the historical debate surrounding the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction and 
withdrawal of expanded corporate liability due, in part, to coordination problems between parties). 
81  David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statue and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 334, 360 (2011).  
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Given the diversity of approaches to the material elements of corporate liability, 
Scheffer contends that “it was not possible to negotiate a new standard of 
corporate criminal liability with universal application in the time frame permitted 
for concluding the Rome Treaty.”82 These diverse approaches primarily disagreed 
on the means of applying corporate liability, not on the question of whether 
corporate liability exists. 83 Of utmost relevance to STL’s decision, general 
principles of law only require a consensus over the existence, not the application, 
of corporate liability.84 
Scheffer’s assertion is consistent with the official records of the U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference. 85 At the conference, the chairman of the working group 
on the general principles of law “recognized the great merits of the relevant 
proposal”86 to introduce corporate criminal liability during the Rome Statute 
debates, but feared that such an introduction would be premature at the time given 
the diversity of approaches to the material elements of corporate liability.87 He 
admitted that “the inclusion [of legal persons] gradually became acceptable to a 
wider group of countries, probably a relatively broad majority,” but “[t]ime was 
running out.”88 
                                                 
82  Scheffer Brief, supra note 6, at 5; See also Garcia, supra note 32, at 122 (citing Michael J. Kelly, Grafting 
the Command Responsibility Doctrine onto Corporate Criminal Liability for Atrocities, 24 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 671, 683 (2010)) (“According to Michael J. Kelly, the fact that the proposed provision did not 
make it into the final statute had much more to do with time constraints affecting the conference 
rather than ‘an overt hostility to the notion of holding companies accountable.’”). 
83  Cf. Stahn, supra note 13, at 96: 
The methods differ across criminal traditions. Some theories attribute the 
conduct of agents to the company as a legal person. Criminal responsibility is 
thus derived from the criminal acts of agents, i.e. corporate officers and senior 
managers (attribution model). It is necessary to inquire whether the agent 
committed the offence, and whether that conduct can be ascribed to the 
corporation based on a relationship to the agent. . . . Newer theories admit that 
the conduct of agents is determined by corporate cultures and collective 
decisionmaking processes, and take into account the aggregated knowledge of 
agents. Others hold the company itself accountable for its own wrongful 
conduct (organizational model). This approach takes into account that collective 
failures such as poor organization or communication may have caused the 
wrong. (citations omitted). 
84  See Schreuer, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that only acceptance of general principle, like procedural 
due process, is necessary). 
85  Kaeb, supra note 37, at 378. 
86  Id. (quoting United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee 
of the Whole, 275 no. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002)).  
87  Id. 
88  Id. (quoting Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 199 (Roy Lee ed., 1999)). 
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Another possible explanation for why corporate liability was not included in 
the ICC is put forward by Professor Caroline Kaeb, a senior lecturer at Loyola 
University School of Law. Kaeb argues that the primary reason corporate liability 
was excluded from the Rome Statute was the complementarity principle.89 
Because not all states provided for corporate liability in their national legal systems 
at the time, corporate liability would allow some states carte blanche access to the 
ICC.90 The Paris negotiator feared this would “overburden the ICC and make 
criminal trials longer and more expensive.”91 Concerns involving the costs of 
investigations and discovery were paramount, as was the lack of consensus 
between states regarding the principle of corporate liability. But as evidenced by 
the STL, this issue “has increasingly lost its relevance”92 because of the ubiquitous 
adoption of corporate liability in the majority of states.93 Scheffer concurred that 
“there is an increasing acceptance of criminal liability in the almost two decades 
since the Rome Treaty was completed.”94 Kaeb goes on to argue that “the main 
reason for not including corporate liability under the Rome Statute in 1998 no 
longer stands today due to the changing legal realities in international criminal 
accountability of corporations.”95 
Lastly, there were also evidentiary concerns,96 and the practical question of 
how investigations were expected to function across national boundaries. This 
remains a legitimate hurdle for all matters of international criminal law, not just 
corporate liability. But by considering the inclusion of legal persons within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, international law is at least capable of creating directly 
enforceable duties for corporations,97 despite these hurdles. 
The final court to consider is the International Court of Justice. The ICJ was 
established by U.N. to solve disputes between members states, and therefore it 
does not have jurisdiction over natural or legal persons.98 However, in Belgium v. 
                                                 
89  Kaeb, supra note 37, at 353. 
90  Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 11, at 1038–39.  
91  Stahn, supra note 13, at 101.  
92  Kaeb, supra note 37, at 353. 
93  Id. (“Specifically, the growing trend in legal systems in Europe, Asia, and South America to 
incorporate extraterritorial corporate liability for international crimes will likely function as a catalyst 
for courts to construe international criminal law so as to apply to corporations as non-state actors.”). 
94  Scheffer Brief, supra note 6, at 4. 
95  Kaeb, supra note 37, at 355. 
96  Id. at 378 (“Furthermore, in its infancy, the ICC would have faced tremendous evidentiary problems 
with regard to the criminal liability of organizations in the absence of any recognized common 
standards.”) 
97  Kolieb, supra note 54, at 600 (citations omitted). 
98  ICJ Statute, supra note 7, at art. 34. 
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Spain,99 a lawsuit involving a dispute between the nations of Belgium and Spain 
regarding a Canadian corporation, the court held that states must properly protect 
and regulate the behavior of natural and legal persons when it admits them into 
its territory.100 In making its decision, the court stated that: 
the need to bring international law into line with present-day requirements 
and conditions is real and urgent. . . . In considering the needs and the good 
of the international community in our changing world, one must realize that 
there are more important aspects than those concerned with economic 
interests and profit making; other legitimate interests of a political and moral 
nature are at stake and should be considered in judging the behavior and operation 
of the complex international scope of modern commercial enterprises.101 
The court was suggesting that corporations can and must be held accountable to 
the norms and standards of international law, even if the ICJ—a court concerned 
with state conflicts—lacked the jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, according to a 
report on the use of domestic legal principles in the development of international 
law,102 the court in Belgium v. Spain affirmed that the procedure of “lifting the 
corporate veil” was “a general principle of law originating from domestic legal 
systems.”103 As will be shown in the following Section, this line of reasoning 
directly mirrors Judge Baragwanath’s legal arguments in Ayyash et al. (“Ayyash”). 
III. THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
A. From Murder to Contempt of Court 
On February 14, 2005, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, 
was assassinated in a suicide truck bomb in Beirut.104 Four members of Hezbollah 
were identified as suspects in the attack, and the Lebanese government requested 
                                                 
99  Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain), Judgement, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 
(Feb. 5). 
100  1970 I.C.J. Rep. at 254-55 (separate opinion by Nervo, J.). 
101  Id. at 248 (separate opinion by Nervo, J.) (emphasis added). 
102  M. H. Mendelson QC et al., Draft Report: The Use of Domestic Law Principles in the Development 
International Law (2016). 
103  Id. at 6 ¶ 16:  
After referring to the ‘wealth of practice accumulated on the subject in 
municipal law’, it stated that ‘in accordance with the principle expounded above, 
the process of lifting the veil, being an exceptional one admitted by municipal 
law, is equally admissible to play a similar role in international law.’ As the 
relevant passage lacks a reference to Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ Statute and does not 
employ its wording, the reference to the municipal origin of the principle is the 
only indicator, which justifies the assertion that the Court may have affirmed a 
general principle of law. 
104  See STL Primary Case, supra note 4. 
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the establishment of a tribunal of an “international character” to prosecute the 
alleged assassins.105 The United Nations Security Council complied by invoking 
Chapter VII,106 the power to restore international peace and security, to create the 
STL.107 The STL began operations in 2009. Two years later, the STL charged four 
Lebanese citizens connected to Hezbollah with “conspiracy aimed at committing 
a terrorist act,” the act being Hariri’s assassination.108 This case, known as Ayyash 
et al., was the STL’s primary case.109 
In August 2012, Al Jadeed TV (“Al Jadeed”), a privately owned Arab TV 
station, aired a series titled “The Witnesses of the International Tribunal.”110 The 
series publicized interviews of confidential witnesses in the Ayyash trial.111 After 
the series was broadcasted on television, it was published on both Al Jadeed’s 
website and its YouTube channel.112 The trial judge presiding over the Ayyash case 
issued an “order directing Al Jadeed not to disseminate confidential information 
alleged to be related to purported witnesses, and to remove any such information 
from its website and other sources.”113 
Al Jadeed failed to comply with the order and its parent company, New TV 
S.A.L., was charged with two counts of contempt of court for: disseminating 
confidential information about court witnesses, and refusing to comply with a 
court order.114 This posed two critical questions for the STL: 1) can a legal entity 
be found guilty of contempt of court under international law? And 2) does the 
STL itself have the jurisdiction to prosecute a legal entity? To answer these 
questions, the judges looked towards the STL’s organic Statute and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 
                                                 
105  S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment, Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art 2, art. 4. [hereinafter 
Statute]. 
106  Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets out the UN Security Council’s powers to maintain 
peace. It allows the Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international 
peace and security”. U.N. Charter art. 39, 41-42. 
107  Statute, supra note 105 at 2 ¶ 1. 
108 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Indictment, ¶ 1 (June 10, 2011), 
http://perma.cc/HB53-G6GA. 
109  See STL Primary Case, supra note 4. 
110  STL Contempt Cases, supra note 8, Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms Khayat, STL-14-05.  
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
114  In re New TV S.A.L. & Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/I/C/J, Redacted Version of Decision in 
Proceedings For Contempt With Orders in Lieu of an Indictment (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/SL8A-3ASW. 
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B. The Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
The STL is often referred to as a court with a hybrid nature,115 or an 
internationalized court.116 This is distinct from the traditional label of an 
international court,117 but it is consistent with the STL’s founding documents that 
described it as “a tribunal of an international character.”118 More than just a 
semantic distinction, the STL’s international characteristics included its mixture 
of Lebanese and international judiciaries, as well as its primacy over Lebanese 
national courts.119 However, because of insufficient political support for the 
inclusion of crimes against humanity and war crimes in its mandate,120 the STL 
was limited to domestic crimes under the Lebanese Penal Code.121 This made the 
STL “unique from previous international courts and Tribunals because it would 
be the first international Tribunal to apply domestic [Lebanese] law exclusively,”122 
albeit with certain modifications.123 
The prosecutors in Ayyash were mandated by the Statute of the STL 
(“Statute”) to apply the Lebanese Criminal Code.124 The Lebanese government 
insisted on charging the suspected criminals with the crime of terrorism, possibly 
for its symbolic value. Since international law lacked a cohesive definition of 
                                                 
115  Francisca Ankrah & Marie Abou-Jaoude, Victim Participation in The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Fuels 
Reflections on International Criminal Law and the Lebanese Justice System, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
MONITOR (Sep. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/N7QW-UP5C.  
116  William A. Scahbas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International Character Equivalent 
to an ‘International Criminal Court’?”, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 513, 523 (June 2008).    
117  F. De Jonge, International Corporate Criminal Liability at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Prosecutor v. 
Karma Al Khayat and Al Jadeed, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY (May 8, 2015), http://perma.cc/AZ9Y-
R566. 
118  Statute, supra note 105, at 12. 
119  Id. 
120  Scahbas, supra note 116, at 519.  
121  U.N. Secretary-General, on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, at 2 ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) (“While in all of these respects the special tribunal has international 
characteristics, its subject matter jurisdiction or the applicable law remain national in character, 
however.”). 
122  Janice Yun, A Tribunal of an International Character Devoid of International Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L 
L. 181, 181 (2010). 
123  See Statute, supra note 105, art 28 (outlining that the Tribunal will follow Lebanese criminal 
procedure rules “as well as by other reference materials”). 
124  Id. art. 2. 
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terrorism,125 Lebanese domestic law provided “the means to prosecute the 
perpetrator of the terrorist attacks,”126 under its definition. 
Procedurally, the STL was governed by the specific Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (“RPE”) it adopted in 2009.127 According to the RPE, when the judges 
of the STL confronted an ambiguity, they had to try and resolve it in a manner 
consistent with the “spirit of the Statute.”128 Furthermore, they could rely on 
interpretative principles drawn from the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, international standards on human rights, and the general principles of 
international criminal law and procedure.129 For example, if the judges found an 
ambiguity regarding the STL’s jurisdiction, they could reference principles of 
international law to resolve the ambiguity. And only if the ambiguity remained 
unresolved could they turn to the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure,130 which 
explicitly allowed for the prosecution of legal entities.131 
C. The Trial 
After Al Jadeed refused to comply with the trial judge’s order to take down 
the documentary footage, their parent company, New TV S.A.L., was charged 
with two counts of contempt of court. New TV S.A.L. moved to dismiss the case 
on the grounds that a legal entity cannot be found liable for violating international 
law.  
According to rule 60 bis(A) of the RPE, the STL had jurisdiction to “hold in 
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully [sic] interfere with its administration 
of justice.”132 Unlike the jurisdiction described in Article 3 of the STL’s Statute, 
the RPE did not explicitly limit contempt crimes to natural persons. The judges 
presiding over the STL disagreed on whether a distinction could be made between 
the jurisdiction provided in the Statute, which limited the court to prosecuting 
natural persons, and the jurisdiction provided in RPE, which had no such limit. 
The following Section briefly covers the main arguments. 
                                                 
125  See Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Victor Tadros, The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism, 16 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 494 (2013). 
126  Yun, supra note 122, at 187. 
127  See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.10, 
(Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter RPE].  
128  Id. at 3. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  LEBANESE PENAL CODE [hereinafter LPC] art. 210, ¶ 2 (“Legal persons shall be criminally 
responsible for the activities of their directors, management staff, representatives and employees 
when such activities are undertaken on behalf of or using the means of such legal persons.”). 
132   RPE, supra note 127, at Rule 60 bis(A). 
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The procedural history is as follows: First, the President of the STL assigned 
an acting judge to hear the arguments in the contempt hearing. The acting 
contempt judge ruled that there was ambiguity in the Statute and that international 
law allows for the prosecution of a corporate entity. Second, the presiding 
contempt judge reversed this decision on the grounds that there can be no 
distinction between the jurisdiction found in the Statute and the RPE. Third, an 
Appeals Panel affirmed the initial decision and held that corporate liability is a 
general principle of international law. 
 
* * * 
 
Judge David Baragwanath, in his capacity as an acting contempt judge, found 
that Rule 60 bis of the RPE extended to acts of contempt allegedly undertaken by 
legal persons.133 His logic was simple: because criminal liability for legal persons 
had become a “familiar and increasingly pervasive legal construct in national 
systems,”134 including the country in which the legal entity in question committed 
its crime,135 the STL should not be bound by antiquated principles, and therefore 
had the jurisdiction to prosecute a media company.  He held there was prima facie 
evidence that New TV S.A.L. violated Rule 60 bis(A) of the RPE136 for “knowing 
and wilfull [sic]” interference in the administration of justice by publishing 
information on purportedly confidential witnesses, and failing to comply with a 
court order to remove the broadcast from its website and YouTube channel.137 
In his decision, Judge Baragwanath drew a distinction between the STL’s 
jurisdiction to hold persons in contempt, an authority necessary to ensure the 
“administration of justice,” and its “primary purposes,” to prosecute persons 
suspected of killing the former Prime Minister.138 He claimed that in order to 
ensure the “administration of justice” in the court room, the obstruction of justice 
powers granted by Rule 60 bis must be read to cover acts of contempt allegedly 
undertaken by legal persons. Otherwise, corporate entities could freely interfere 
                                                 
133  In the Case Against New TV S.A.L Karma Mohamed Thasin Al Khayat, STL-14-05/I/CJ, Decision 
in Proceedings for Contempt with Order in Lieu of an Indictment, ¶ 4 (Special Trib. for Leb. Jan. 
31, 2014) [hereinafter Initial Decision].   
134  Id. at ¶ 18. 
135  Id. at ¶ 26. 
136  Id. at ¶ 4(i). 
137 Id.  
138  Id. at ¶ 24 (“Whether a legal person can be accused under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute is a very 
different question from whether a legal person can be held in contempt for knowingly and wilfully 
[sic] interfering with the administration of justice.”). 
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with the judicial process.139 In fact, he believed “[i]t would not only be naive but 
dangerous to accept that only natural persons can interfere with the administration 
of justice.”140 
Although Judge Baragwanath acknowledged that this would be the first time 
an international court prosecuted a legal entity,141 he found sufficient evidence to 
conclude that corporate liability could be applied as a general principle of law. 
Specifically, he recognized that “the last couple of decades have witnessed major 
change[s]” culminating in a “general trend in most countries towards bringing 
corporate entities to book for their criminal acts or the criminal acts of their 
officers.”142 Corporate liability, he argued, had become common practice among 
the nations of the world, and could thus be the basis for prosecuting a legal entity 
in an international court. 
His final piece of evidence for expanding the definition of “persons” to 
include legal entities was that Lebanon, along with a growing number of civil law 
countries, 
deliberately rejected societas delinquere non potest [corporations cannot be 
criminal] in favour [sic] of an approach which holds legal persons accountable 
for criminal behaviour [sic] attributable to them. It would be bizarre for this 
Tribunal to deny protection of its due process against corporate interference 
because of an ancient maxim that the State it serves has rejected.143 
Following this groundbreaking decision, Judge Baragwanath recused himself from 
the contempt hearings and designated Judge Nicola Lettieri to be the official 
contempt judge to review his prima facie decision.144 
 
* * * 
 
After Judge Baragwanath issued his prima facie decision, the presiding 
contempt judge was charged with comprehensively reviewing the issue. Several 
months of deliberation later, the contempt judge, Nicola Lettieri, rejected the 
holding that Rule 60 bis applied to legal entities.145 He reversed the decision on the 
                                                 
139  Id. at ¶ 28. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at ¶ 25 (“I reach this conclusion mindful of its novelty in the international criminal justice 
context. To date no contempt case has been brought against a legal person in an international 
criminal tribunal or court.”). 
142  Id. at ¶ 26 (citation omitted).  
143  Id.  
144  See In the Case Against New TV S.A.L Karma Mohamed Thasin Al Khayat, STL-14-05/PT/CJ, 
Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction and on Request for Leave to Amend Order in Lieu 
of an Indictment, ¶ 3 (Special Trib. for Leb. July 24, 2014) [hereinafter Lettieri Decision]. 
145  Id. at ¶ 58. 
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narrow basis that the wording of the Statute does not apply to legal persons.146 He 
held that “[h]owever preferable de lege ferenda [‘with a view to the future law’] it 
might be to have corporations answer to charges of contempt, this preference 
does not suffice to solidly ground the Tribunal’s jurisdiction de lege lata [‘the law as 
it exists’].”147 
Judge Lettieri based his ruling on principles of statutory interpretation. While 
he conceded that, “international law does not prohibit the imposition of criminal 
liability for corporations,”148 he argued that no general principle of law allowed 
the “ordinary meaning of ‘person’ . . . to include legal persons.”149 Furthermore, 
he believed that the lack of ambiguity with relation to the word “person” and the 
“lack of consensus in the international system and among domestic systems on 
corporate criminal liability, compel a finding that corporate liability under 
Lebanese law is inapplicable here.”150 
Judge Lettieri attempted to follow his mandate as narrowly as possible and 
not make a judgment on evolving standards of international corporate liability.151 
His decision overturned the original indictment against New TV S.A.L. placing 
the case into the hands of an Appeals Panel forced to address both the statutory 
interpretation issues and the broader question of whether corporate liability is 
applicable under international law. 
 
* * * 
 
Unlike Judge Lettieri, the Majority of the Appeals Panel (“the Majority”) 
found that ambiguity existed with respect to the term “person” in Rule 60 bis. 152 
Therefore, they turned to Rule 3, which called for a teleological reading of Rule 
60 bis in line with the “spirit” rather than the mere “letter of the Statute.”153 
According to Rule 3, this reading should be informed by the principles of 
interpretation laid down in “customary international law . . . international 
                                                 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at ¶ 68. 
148  Id. at ¶ 75. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at ¶ 78. 
151  Id. at ¶ 68 (Judge Lettieri wanted the decision to have at “some basis—at least implicit—in Rule 60 
bis, which is the provision specifically addressing contempt and obstruction of justice.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
152  Majority Decision, supra note 21, at ¶ 60. 
153 Id. at ¶ 38. 
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standards on human rights . . . general principles of international criminal law and 
procedure and . . . [as needed] the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure.”154 
The Majority explicitly criticized Judge Lettieri for “not giving sufficient 
weight to domestic practice under Rule 3 (A) in interpreting the trend 
criminalizing the acts of legal entities.”155 After conducting a thorough 
examination of evolving international standards,156 as well as trends in national 
legal systems,157 the Majority found there was “a concrete movement on an 
international level backed by the United Nations for . . . corporate 
accountability,”158 and that “there is an emerging shared international 
understanding on the need to address corporate responsibility.”159 This emerging 
trend placed “positive obligations” on both natural persons and legal entities.160 
Therefore, the Majority held that the term “person” may “include legal entities for 
the purposes of Rule 60 bis.”161 
Because general principles of law only require a showing that most countries 
adopt the same notion,162 once the Majority empirically found that “corporate 
liability for serious harms is a feature of most of the world's legal systems,”163 they 
concluded that corporate liability “qualifies as a general principle of law.”164 Although 
corporate liability laws are not identical across jurisdictions, the Majority found 
they are “sufficiently similar”165 to signify a major trend.166 As a matter of principle, 
                                                 
154  RPE, supra 127, at Rule 3.  
155  Majority Decision, supra note 21, at ¶ 60. 
156  Id. at ¶ 45–51. 
157  Id. at ¶ 52–56. 
158  Id. at ¶ 46. 
159 Id. 
160  Id.  
161  Id. at ¶ 60 (emphasis in original). 
162  Antonine Fabiani Case, X REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 83, 117 (July 31, 1905) (“By reference 
to the general principles of the law of nations on the denial of justice, i.e., to the rules common to most 
legislations.”) (emphasis in original).  
163  Majority Decision, supra note 21, at ¶ 67. 
164  Id. (emphasis added). 
165  Id. at ¶ 51. 
166  Id. at ¶ 58 (“[I]t is apparent that in a majority of the legal systems in the world, corporations are not 
immune from accountability merely because they are a legal—and not a natural—person.”). Among 
the European states the court found to have corporate accountability include Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K. Germany and Italy were 
the two outliers. In addition to the European states, the court considered the following countries 
that also adopted a form of corporate liability: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Senegal, South Africa, Syria, U.A.E., and the U.S. Id. at ¶ 52, 55.  
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“judicial remedies are not barred against a legal person on account that some 
national laws limit the applicability of criminal law to legal persons.”167 
Accordingly, the Majority ruled that the STL had personal jurisdiction over legal 
entities in contempt proceedings, and reinstated the indictment against Al 
Jadeed.168 
Judge Walid Akoum dissented and objected to the Majority’s interpretation 
of the term “person,” but he did not discredit or disparage the Majority’s analysis 
of evolving international legal principles.169 Instead, he based his decision on what 
he called the “fundamental and holy principles of criminal law,”170 namely, “nullum 
crimen sine lege scripta (crimes must be based on written provisions), nullum crimen sine 
lege stricta (strict construction of criminal provisions) and in dubio pro reo (when in 
doubt, side for the accused).”171 Judge Akoum’s dissent can be distilled into two 
points. 
First, he took issue with the notion that “merely including the word ‘person’ 
in the relevant law and/or treaty is enough to extend its application to legal 
persons.”172 Judge Akoum could not find prior examples of liability extending to 
corporations “when only the word ‘person’ had been used.”173 
Second, Judge Akoum disagreed with the Majority’s reasoning that the 
“inherent contempt power of the Tribunal can be broader than the jurisdiction 
ratione personae as contained in the Tribunal's Statute.”174 He pointed to what he 
thought was an illogical consequence of this ruling: that a legal entity could be 
criminally prosecuted for contempt in the STL but that it could not “be 
prosecuted for participation in the killing of former Prime Minister Hariri”—“the 
very reason why this Tribunal was created in the first place.”175 He described this 
as  an “odd reality” and stated that “[i]f this strange result was indeed the intention 
of the drafters, then in my view this outcome should have been provided for 
explicitly, and not arrived at through (expansive) judicial interpretation.”176 
                                                 
167  Id. at ¶ 48. 
168 Id. at ¶ 93. 
169  See In the Case Against New TV S.A.L Karma Mohamed Thasin Al Khayat, STL-14-
05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walid Akoum (Special Trib. for Leb. Oct. 2, 
2014) [hereinafter Dissenting Opinion]. 
170  Id. at ¶ 2. 
171  Id.  
172 Id. at ¶ 17. 
173  Id. at ¶ 21. 
174  Id. at ¶ 4. 
175  Id.  
176  Id. 
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Most noteworthy in Judge Akoum’s dissenting opinion is that he did not 
“offer [a] view on whether or not customary international law or general principles 
of law presently recognise [sic] corporate criminal liability. Should they not, [he] 
neither purport[ed] to impede nor prevent their future crystallisation [sic] and 
recognition through State action and/or subsequent judicial opinions.”177 
He went on to say that it “would be unwise to read my opinion as to stifle a 
clear trend towards the recognition of corporate criminal liability.” 178 Just like 
Judge Lettieri before him, Judge Akoum believed the STL could have been given 
the authority to prosecute a legal entity; he simply felt that its jurisdiction to do so 
in this particular context was “generally limited by the terms contained in the 
Statute.” 179 
Once the Majority decided that legal entities were within the STL’s 
jurisdiction, the case was allowed to proceed against Al Jadeed and the contempt 
judge had to determine whether the corporate defendant was actually guilty of the 
alleged crime. In September 2015, the Judge Lettieri rendered his judgment against 
Al Jadeed, finding the media company not guilty of all counts.180 The judgment 
was appealed and upheld in March 2016.181 Therefore, although Al Jadeed was the 
first legal entity to be indicted in a court of international law, it was not the first 
legal entity to be convicted. However, it paved the way for a later conviction. 
In a concurrent hearing that occurred in the same STL contempt court, the 
media company Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. was also charged and indicted for violating 
Rule 60 bis for publishing articles that contained information about confidential 
witnesses in the Ayyash case on their websites and newspapers.182 The corporate 
defendant immediately appealed the indictment on the same grounds as Al Jadeed 
(that liability cannot extend to legal entities), and on January 23, 2015, the Appeals 
Panel affirmed their findings in the Al Jadeed case, holding that the STL had 
jurisdiction over legal entities.183 Although the affirmation of the Akbar Beirut 
S.A.L. indictment did not add anything new to the discussion, it was important 
because it confirmed the findings of Al Jadeed, indicating it is “no longer an 
isolated decision.”184 
                                                 
177  Id. at ¶ 2. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at ¶ 3. 
180 Contempt Cases, supra note 8, Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms Khayat (STL-14-05). 
181  Id. 
182  Contempt Cases, supra note 8, Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Mr Al Amin (STL-14-06). 
183 Id. 
184  Nadia Bernaz, Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Appeals Panel Confirms Jurisdiction over Corporations in Akhbar 
Beirut S.A.L. Contempt Case, RIGHTS AS USUAL (Feb. 5, 2015), http://perma.cc/U6D4-4C5T.  
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However, this indictment resulted in a conviction. In 2015 Judge Lettieri 
found corporate defendant Akhbar guilty, marking the first time a legal entity was 
convicted and sentenced under international law.185 Because the Appeals Panel 
provided no clear guidance on the material elements of convicting and sentencing 
a legal entity, Judge Lettieri had to identify the elements and parameters himself. 
Recognizing the lack of any relevant international convention, international 
custom, or general principle of law with respect to the elements of corporate 
liability, Judge Lettieri concluded that the fairest thing to do was to apply Lebanese 
law.186 He reasoned that this would preempt claims that the corporate defendant 
was unfairly charged of a crime it could not have foreseen, because the 
corporation was domiciled in and substantially operated within Lebanon, a 
country that recognizes corporate accountability.187 
IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISM OF THE STL 
The STL’s holding that corporate liability is a general principle of law should 
have expanded corporate accountability in the international context. However, in 
the four years since this case was decided, no international court or prosecutor 
has cited the STL to expand jurisdiction over a corporate entity. This is likely the 
result of criticism that has sought to delegitimize or limit the holding in three 
distinct ways. 
The first critique challenges the substantive holding, arguing that the STL 
prematurely held corporate liability to be a general principle of law. The second 
critique challenges the legal process, and the third applauds the normative 
ambition of the STL, but argues that the holding is limited in scope to contempt 
crimes.188 
                                                 
185  Contempt Cases, supra note 8, Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Mr Al Amin (STL-14-06). 
186  In the Case Against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Al Amin, STL-14-06/T/CJ, Public 
Redacted Version of the Judgement, ¶ 44 (Special Trib. for Leb., Jul. 15, 2016). 
187  Id. at ¶ 45 (“Thus, under Lebanese law, in order for the corporate Accused to be held criminally 
responsible for the count charged, the prosecution must: (1) establish the criminal responsibility of 
a specific natural person; (2) demonstrate that, at the relevant time, such natural person was a 
director, member of the administration, representative (someone authorized by the legal person to 
act in its name) or an employee/worker (who must have been provided by the legal body with 
explicit authorization to act in its name) of the corporate Accused; and (3) prove that the natural 
person’s criminal conduct was done either (a) on behalf of or (b) using the means of the corporate 
Accused.”). 
188  Statute, supra note 105, art. 2. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 476 Vol. 20 No. 2 
A. In Defense of the Holding 
The primary criticism of the STL’s decision is that it is too soon to label 
corporate liability a general principle of law. This argument is bolstered by decades 
of impunity for corporate entities in international courts, and the historic principle 
societas delinquere non potest (“a legal entity cannot be blameworthy”).189 However, in 
light of recent developments in state practice and the international community, 
critics of the STL do not seriously advance this outdated argument.190 Instead, 
they attempt to downplay the significance of the decision by calling it premature.191 
For example, Professor Stahn recognized that there are at least “seventeen 
multilateral international instruments with provisions on corporate criminal 
liability,”192 and he acknowledged that, “[t]he classical view that international 
criminal law is a system without a space for corporate criminal liability is under 
challenge.”193 Yet, because the international community had not decided what 
areas and in what forums corporate responsibility may best be pursued, he was 
                                                 
189  See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine 
Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L. J. 126, 129 (2008).  
190  See Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporations: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 38–41 (1957) (discussing the contemporary 
rejection of the historical concept that legal persons are unable to form a mens rea or to be subject 
to criminal liability). 
191  Perhaps they are concerned about cases such as Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d 
Cir. 2010), a U.S. court case in which the Second Circuit significantly narrowed the scope of 
corporate liability for violations of international law in the United States. Id. at 125. (The plaintiffs 
relied on the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). The ATS which confers on district courts “original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). In its decision, the court expanded on 
what was otherwise a domestic legal issue by providing a comprehensive review of corporate 
accountability under international law. Central to the court’s decision was the question of “whether 
corporations can be subject to liability for violations of customary international law.”). Id. However, 
this domestic decision was based on customary law, and not general principles of law. And the 
Second Circuit made this decision despite the fact that “Judge Leval and prominent international 
law scholars such as David Scheffer and Ralph Steinhardt (on behalf of fifteen other international 
law scholars as amici in support of petitioners in Kiobel), all conclude[d] that international law does 
not exempt corporations from its scope.” Kaeb, supra note 37, at 363. Although the decision had no 
direct precedential power on international law, general principles are derived from domestic 
practice, and the court’s declaration that corporations cannot be liable for international crimes 
under international law could possibly have a chilling effect on an otherwise strong trend towards 
corporate accountability. See generally DESISLAVA STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2010). 
192  Stahn, supra note 13, at 95; see Bert Swart, International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of 
Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 949 (2008) (noting in 2008 “a total of 17 
multilateral international instruments containing one or more provisions on corporate criminal 
liability, while before 1997 none existed at all.”). 
193  Stahn, supra note 13, at 105. 
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unwilling to support the STL’s decision and instead said “it is certainly too early 
to claim that corporate criminal responsibility is a general principle of law.”194 
Similarly, Professor Kaeb wrote that “[c]orporate criminal liability 
prescriptions for involvement in international crimes have become increasingly 
common in legal systems around the world.”195 She observed that “a growing 
number of legal systems around the world have included corporate liability for 
international crimes into their criminal codes.”196 In fact, she argued it is almost 
impossible to ignore the growing international trend.197 And she believed, this 
growing trend would “likely function as a catalyst for courts to construe 
international criminal law so as to apply to corporations as non-state actors.”198 
But, after examining the STL’s holding, she argued that “further specification on 
the part of the courts and scholars will be required to determine whether corporate 
liability is primarily a matter of interpretation under the statute of the respective 
international tribunal, or whether it has developed into a general principle of 
international law.”199 
This hesitation to categorically embrace the STL’s holding does not 
accurately reflect developments from the U.N., multi-lateral governmental 
organizations, and domestic legal regimes. In fact, the sources of international law 
all point to a common principle shared by national systems, supporting the STL’s 
conclusion that corporate liability has become a general principle of law. Indeed, 
as Scheffer aptly notes, “[t]he trend lines globally point towards more, not less, 
accountability for both natural persons and corporations in the commission of 
atrocity crimes,”200 and “[t]his trend complements the general principle of law of 
corporate civil liability that existed in 1998 [the creation of the Rome Statute] in 
practically all legal systems.”201 Alexandra Garcia, a Harvard Law School fellow, 
found that the “recognition of corporate criminal liability has cut across borders 
and legal systems,”202 revealing “an emerging common pattern of generalized 
practice.”203 This corroborated another comparative study that uncovered 
“common lines of conceptualization, rather than stark differences, between 
                                                 
194  Id. at 124. 
195  Kaeb, supra note 37, at 353. 
196  Id. at 351–52. 
197  Id. at 352. 
198  Id. at 353. 
199  Id. at 371. 
200  Scheffer Brief, supra note 6, at 31. 
201  Id. at 20. 
202  Garcia, supra note 32, at 106. 
203  Id. at 107. 
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common law and civil law systems in their acceptance of corporate criminal 
liability.”204 
As Kaeb predicted, this domestic trend is already beginning to act as a 
catalyst for international institutions, as seen by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council’s205 adoption of the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (“UNGP”).206 The UNGP is grounded on the principle that it is a 
state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses in its territory “by third parties, 
including business enterprises.”207 This created the first global standard for 
preventing and protecting human rights abuses related to business activity. 
However, this is not a binding legal treaty, but a normative “social contract” that 
merely calls on each nation to comply with its respective domestic law in order to 
prevent or mitigate corporate abuse. 
Nonetheless, the UNGP remains the strongest international agreement in 
favor of corporate accountability. Even though it alone cannot act as the basis for 
a prosecution of a legal entity, it supports the STL’s argument that there is a 
general trend toward corporate accountability. By 2010, scholars were already 
arguing that conceptually, “transnational business corporations are bound by the 
prohibitions underlying the core crime of international law, despite the fact that 
currently no international criminal court or tribunal has jurisdiction to hold them 
accountable.”208 
Further evidence of this general principle lies in the Malabo Protocol, which 
extends the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples Rights to “legal persons, with the exception of States.”209 James G. 
Stewart, who served as an Appeals Counsel with the Prosecution of the U.N. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and as a prosecutor in 
                                                 
204  Id. at 106 (referencing Markus D. Dubber, The Comparative History and Theory of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2013)). 
205  “The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system made 
up of 47 States responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights around the globe.” 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://perma.cc/YCD4-9U4G. 
206  UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011). 
207  Id. at 3.  
208  Volker Nerlich, Core Crimes and Transnational Business Corporations, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 895, 908 
(2010); see also G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, art. 1 (July 18, 1976) (acknowledging the capacity of 
organizations and institutions to commit the crime of apartheid). 
209  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, A.U. Doc. No. STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev. 1 (May 15, 2014), at 35, art. 46(C); see 
also Matiangai Sirleaf, The African Justice Cascade and the Malabo Protocol, 11 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. 71, 76–77 (2017); List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to The Protocol 
on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
AFRICAN UNION (Mar. 20, 2019), http://perma.cc/X9F3-P6HE.  
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the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,210 recently described the 
recognition of corporate criminal liability for international crimes as “the next 
obvious ‘discovery’ in corporate responsibility.”211 And a growing body of 
scholarship and international legal instruments suggests that “alongside the rights 
and benefits that many transnational corporations (“TNCs”) now enjoy under the 
international legal order are international legal duties to abide by core human 
rights and humanitarian law standards.”212 
B. In Defense of the Legal Process 
The second group of critics can be further divided into two camps: the first 
rejects the “judicial activism” of the court, and the second argues that the 
distinction made between jurisdiction for contempt and core crimes invalidated 
the underlying holding. 
Some critics believe the STL partook in “judicial activism,”213 or the more 
pernicious activity of “judicial vigilantism.”214 This is often a criticism leveled 
against judges believed to have retroactively made legal arguments to justify 
preordained decisions.215  For example, Karlijn van der Voort, a legal officer for 
the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel, attacked the STL Majority’s “idealistic 
approach” as unconvincing and lacking a “strong legal basis for the future 
development of corporate criminal liability.”216 Dov Jacobs, the former editor-in-
chief of the European Journal of Legal Studies, called the majority’s decision a 
“molotov cocktail on the principle of legality”217 and claimed that “the arguments 
raised in the decision belong more to a policy paper than a judicial 
decision.”218 More specifically, Jacobs believed that the Appeals Panel “look[ed] 
for anything under international law that would not allow them to interpret 
                                                 
210 Biography, JAMES G. STEWART, http://perma.cc/8UXK-JBCF. 
211  James Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort 
Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 121 (2014). 
212  Kolieb, supra note 54, at 574 (2017).  
213  Rees, supra note 5 
214  Jacobs, supra note 5. 
215 Judicial activism refers to “court rulings that are partially or fully based on the judge’s political or 
personal considerations, rather than existing laws.” Judicial Activism, ONLINE LEGAL DICTIONARY, 
http://perma.cc/37TL-LG4M. 
216  Karlijn Van der Voort, STL Appeals Chamber Decides It Can Prosecute Legal Persons for Contempt, 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR (Oct. 13, 2014), http://perma.cc/Y77J-H7J4. 
217  Dov Jacobs, A Molotov Cocktail on the Principle of Legality: STL confirms contempt proceedings against legal 
persons, SPREADING THE JAM (Oct. 6, 2014), http://perma.cc/3LPR-KTTZ. 
218 Jacobs, supra note 5. 
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person” in a way to “fight against impunity.”219 He argued that “[a]t this point, [it 
was] not even teleological interpretation anymore, it [was] backwards reasoning in 
its purest form!”220 
Although this is not an unfair characterization of the process informing the 
Appeals Panel’s decision, it is more aptly named “legal pragmatism,” which is a 
forward-looking and policy-based adjudication method that “regard[s] adherence 
to past decisions as a (qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty.”221 When 
a legal pragmatist is confronted with a gap in the application of a law to a certain 
set of facts, they fill the gap with policy and social considerations. While this 
method of jurisprudence “was reasonably shocking seventy years ago,” 
pragmatism in “the ensuing decades . . . has gradually been absorbed into 
American common sense.”222 
In this case, the STL was motivated by principles of fairness and justice; the 
President of the STL noted that “modern history is replete with examples where 
great harm has been caused by corporations with the advantages that result from 
the recognition of their status as legal persons.”223 This does not, in and of itself, 
discredit the legal analysis. Even if public policy concerns underlie the decision, a 
moral impetus is not sufficient to discredit the legal basis of the opinion itself.224 
Beyond general criticisms of the judicial activism in Ayyash, some critics took 
specific aim at what they claim to be the false distinction the STL made between 
jurisdiction of core crimes and jurisdiction of contempt crimes. These critics claim 
that this “decision falls down . . . in the illogical consequences of its ultimate 
                                                 
219  Jacobs, supra note 217. 
220  Id.  
221  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1, 60 (2003). 
222  Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 
89, 89 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
223  Yvonne McDermott Rees, Criminal Liability for Legal Persons for Contempt Returns to the STL, HUMAN 
RIGHTS DOCTORATE BLOGSPOT (Oct. 8, 2014), http://perma.cc/3QRE-Z7QB (citation omitted).   
224  Consider the example of a judge, confronted with a man who killed another man out of a fear for 
his own life. Pretend the judge is newly appointed and knows nothing of criminal law, but her moral 
compass tells her that this man deserves a more lenient sentence than a man who kills for a selfish 
reason. And so, the judge might labor to look in the law to see if there was anything that would 
prevent the judge from giving the man a more merciful punishment. In doing so, the judge would 
likely find the doctrine of “self-defense,” and it would be perfectly within the judge’s right to apply 
this doctrine. This hypothetical, at its most basic level, could also be described as backwards 
reasoning. To discredit the judge’s decision, however, one must still prove that the self-defense 
doctrine does not apply, not just that the judge wanted to grant leniency. Because, as long as the 
judge is operating within the legal framework given, her decision is valid. In the Ayyash case, these 
restraints took the form of an empirical inquiry into whether corporate liability had become a 
general principle of law. Simply calling the outcome of this decision the result of judicial activism 
is not enough to invalidate it. 
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conclusion - that corporate liability only attaches to contempt offences.”225 They 
believe “the arguments raised in favor of corporate responsibility for contempt 
apply equally to corporate responsibility for any criminal conduct.”226 Citing the 
STL’s own language, Dov Jacobs asks, “[i]f a corporate entity were behind the 
Hariri assassination, would it not be ‘bizarre’ to deny victims justice against such 
[sic] entity that they would have gotten before a Lebanese court for the same 
acts?”227 
As a threshold matter, even if there is merit to the argument that the STL 
incorrectly distinguished between jurisdiction for core and contempt crimes, this 
criticism is orthogonal to the claim that Ayyash was correct in its analysis of 
corporate liability under international law. Although the ultimate verdict was a 
charge of contempt, the STL did not analyze the principle of corporate liability 
exclusively within the context of contempt crimes, and the validity of their analysis 
does not hang on this procedural question of jurisdiction. 
That being said, it is neither strange nor “bizarre” for a court to have 
expansive jurisdiction to ensure its administration of justice, even when this 
jurisdiction is not explicitly mentioned in the court’s statute. In fact, a quick survey 
of the historical and modern applications of the crime of contempt supports the 
majority’s distinction. The locus classicus in the law of contempt of court228 is the 
seminal case of Roach v. Garvan,229 in which the court “sent the printer of the St. 
James’s Evening Post to prison for publishing an article about witnesses in a pending 
case.”230 Not only does this case remain the law in England today,231 but the 
following statement by the court establishes the logic behind an expansive 
jurisdiction for contempt: 
Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice than to preserve their 
proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of more 
pernicious consequence than to prejudice the minds of the publick [sic] 
against persons concerned as parties in causes, before the cause is finally 
heard. 232 
And in the modern era, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court 
                                                 
225  Rees, supra note 223. 
226 Jacobs, supra note 5. 
227 Id. 
228  See Zelman Cowen, Professor of Public Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of 
Melbourne, lecture given at the Law Summer School held at the University of Western Australia, 
Some Observations on the Law of Criminal Contempt (1965) in 7(1) UWA L. REV. 1, 1. 
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for Sierra Leone were all called upon to consider cases of contempt of court.233 
Although none of their statutes explicitly empowered the judges to use their rules 
of procedure and evidence to create new charges or criminal offenses, the 
chambers of these tribunals consistently held that judges are allowed to adopt rules 
to preserve the exercise of their jurisdiction and safeguard their basic judicial 
functions.234 Such conduct was deemed to be within “the inherent jurisdiction of 
Tribunals.”235 This is consistent with the STL’s position that even if the STL’s 
Statute does not “specifically provide for contempt . . . [t]he Tribunal’s power to 
prosecute this crime derives from its inherent jurisdiction to protect the integrity 
of the judicial process and to ensure the proper administration of justice.”236 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear why the ordinary meaning of “person” in 
international law should not include corporate legal persons. None of the critics 
provide any affirmative evidence to support this position, and the readily available 
evidence points to the contrary. If the ordinary meaning of “person” did not 
encompass legal persons, why did the drafters of the statutes of the International 
Criminal Court,237 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,238 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia239 see the need to 
                                                 
233  Silvia D’Ascoli, Sentencing Contempt of Court in Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 735–736 n.1 
(2007) (“In chronological order, as of 30 April 2007, the cases in which convictions were 
pronounced for contempt of the tribunal at the ICTY are the following: Finding of Contempt of 
the Tribunal, Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-R77), Trial Chamber, 11December 1998; Judgment on 
Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin, Tadić (IT-94-1-A-R77), Appeals 
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Proceedings Against Kosta Bulatović) (IT-02-54-R77.4), Trial Chamber, 13 May 2005; Judgment 
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235  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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pursuant to this Statute.”). 
238  Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 5, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994) (“The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the 
provisions of the present Statute.”).  
239  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 38, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), 
adopted by Security Council on 25 May, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (“The International 
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present 
Statute.”). 
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specifically limit the jurisdiction of these courts to “natural persons,”240 while there 
is no such limit in the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence?241 The answer 
suggests that the drafters recognized that an ordinary interpretation of the word 
“person” does in fact include corporate legal persons. 
C. The Scope of the Decision 
The third group of critics welcomed the STL decision as the “foundation for 
further development of liability of corporate entities in international criminal 
law”242 and “an important step to address a structural bias inside international 
criminal law against the responsibility of legal persons.”243 However, this group of 
international scholars argues that the true impact of the STL decision is limited in 
scope,244 because the decision is “about an offence against the administration of 
justice, and not about a core crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction,”245 
and is “at least partially based on Lebanese law.”246 Unlike the first group of critics, 
these skeptics do not believe the distinction between contempt crimes and the 
core crimes under the jurisdiction of the STL invalidates the decision, but rather 
that it limits its application in future cases. They worry that the expansion of 
corporate liability will be limited to contempt crimes, as opposed to the core 
crimes international law traditionally governs. They expect this limitation because 
contempt powers are uniquely vital to the effective authority of courts and thus 
require a more expansive and flexible interpretation than core crimes. 
The STL’s underlying justification for expanding the definition of “person” 
to include legal entities placates this concern. If the STL’s evidence was drawn 
from other contempt hearings, then the claim that this decision is limited to 
contempt crimes would have merit. But all of the arguments, justifications, and 
examples the STL cited were not limited to contempt cases. Rather, the STL 
surveyed cases in the Military Tribunals of Nuremberg, the statute of the ICC, 
U.N. resolutions, and domestic laws that deal with corporate liability more 
broadly. When the STL declared that corporate liability had become a general 
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principle of law, it did not limit this holding to contempt crimes. It issued a broad 
principle that could apply to any criminal violation. 
Additionally, some skeptics are concerned about the hybrid nature of the 
court. Because the STL relied on Lebanese law, they argue this limits its 
precedential authority in an international context. More specifically, they claim 
that Akhbar’s reliance on the Lebanese Criminal Code to model the elements of 
the crime diminishes the significance of the court’s impact on corporate liability 
under international law.247 
While it is true that Article 210(2) of the Lebanese Criminal Code provided 
the STL with the material elements required to prosecute corporate legal entities, 
this reliance on Lebanese law came after the STL established that corporate 
liability was a general principle of law. In other words, Lebanese law influenced 
how the court prosecuted a legal entity, but it was not dispositive in the decision to 
prosecute a legal entity. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the STL’s ruling on 
the international legal principle of corporate liability was limited to contempt 
crimes or in drawing from Lebanese law. 
Since nearly all states have recognized corporate liability in the criminal 
context, and since no international court that adjudicates criminal law has 
prohibited corporate criminal liability as a matter of law, it follows that the STL’s 
analysis regarding corporate criminal liability is correct and applies in a broad 
general context in international law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon held that corporate liability is now a 
general principle of law, noting that it “no longer seems to be a matter of whether 
corporations are liable under international law, but rather how such liability would 
be implemented.”248 This Comment has defended the STL’s decision in Ayyash, 
both procedurally and substantively. In doing so, this Comment responded 
directly to criticism and sought to dispel the notion that corporate criminal liability 
is prohibited under international law or that it is too soon to declare corporate 
liability a general principle. 
Inspired by the STL, international lawyers can and should challenge the 
accountability gaps that allow many corporations to escape liability under 
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international law.249 Corporations enjoy many benefits arising out of the globalized 
society in which we live: they lobby for international policies, they profit from 
multi-lateral trade agreements, and they even reserve the right to sue sovereign 
states and other legal entities.250 Scholars have written extensively on how 
“[c]orporate actors have far too often engaged in the perpetration of mass 
atrocities and even more often proven to be de facto or de jure exempt from 
liability.”251 The STL provides the blueprint for countering this immunity and 
ushers in a new era of corporate accountability. As a practical matter, the STL may 
encourage legal practitioners seeking corporate accountability to take advantage 
of statutes that do not explicitly limit the term “person” to natural persons.252 
Whatever the strategy may be, anyone who seeks to resolve the issue of 
international corporate accountability must now reckon with the STL landmark 
decision, not as a judicial aberration, but as a well-reasoned precedent of 
international law. 
                                                 
249  See generally Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability (May 17, 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript). 
250  Kolieb, supra note 54, at 574.   
251  Garcia, supra note 32, at 127. 
252  Ekaterina Kopylova, Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Guilty of Contempt, STL Found: One Small Verdict for a 
Tribunal, a Giant Leap for International Justice?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 8, 2016), http://perma.cc/J7FD-
RRFX. 
